摘要
对中央银行独立的讨论都建立在中央银行独立制度可以隔断政府对货币市场的影响这样一个预设前提上。基于国家货币理论,本文通过对美国货币金融制度的实际状况进行分析发现,即使在中央银行独立的情况下,政府的财政政策仍会对货币市场产生影响,起到和货币政策相同的作用;对于一个主权货币国家来说,政府总是可以通过间接的方式从中央银行取得融资。这与中央银行不独立的情况没有本质区别,说明在被奉为央行独立典范的美国,美联储实际上是不独立的,中央银行独立是一个伪命题。在过去的三十年中,中央银行独立逐步演变成了一种意识形态。这种意识形态在给发达国家的财政金融制度披上一层面纱的同时,为新自由主义推行减少国家干预和经济金融化的政策铺平了道路,并具有维护美元霸权的制度化功能。这种意识形态会成为阻碍发展中国家实现赶超的思想障碍。
The previous discussions on the independence of the central bank are based on the assumption that the independence of the central bank can cut off the government＇s influence on money market. Based on Sovereign Money Theory, this paper summarizes previous studies and analyses the state of American monetary and financial system. It is found that even with the independence of the central bank, the government＇s fiscal poli- cy still exerts its influence on the money market and plays the same function as mone- tary policy; for a country with currency sovereignty, the government can always get fi- nanced from the central bank indirectly, which performs the same as the situation where the central bank is not independent. The Federal Reserve of the United States, regarded as a model for the independence of the central bank, is in fact not independent Therefore, the independence of central bank is a pseudo-proposition. During the past three decades, the independence of the central bank has gradually evolved into an ideol ogy which veiled the fiscal and financial systems of developed countries, paved the way for neo-liberalism to reduce state＇s interference as well as to boost financialization, and served as an institution to protect dollar hegemony. If developing countries can not cor rectly understand the essence of this ideology, for developing countries to catch up. ideology will kick away the ＂ladder＂
出处
《政治经济学评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第2期53-68,共16页
China Review of Political Economy
基金
中国人民大学"统筹推进世界一流大学和一流学科建设"经费支持
项目批准号:16XNLG08
关键词
中央银行独立
现代货币理论
美国货币金融制度
踢掉梯子
independence of central bank
modern money theory
American monetaryand financial system
kick away the ladder
