摘要
针对具有限制结盟结构特征的三级供应链合作创新联盟问题,分析了由单个供应商、制造商和销售商组成的不同联盟系统下的收益情况,并运用图合作博弈的average tree solution(简称"A-T解")法对各成员的收益进行了分配。结果表明,所有成员参与供应链联盟时总收益最大,且A-T解分配法与Shapley值法相比更具合理性和有效性,能充分突出成员在合作联盟中的特殊地位(位置)及其重要性,该结论进一步通过比较不同级别结构下的供应链收益分配问题进行说明。
In view of the three levels supply chain co-innovation with restricted alliance structure characteristic, we analyze the profits of different supply chain innovation alliance system, which is composed of a supplier, a manufacturer and a retailer. And the average tree solution （for short ＂A-T solution＂ ） of graph cooperative game is used for the profit allocation. The results show that the supply chain profit is maximum when all players in alliance, and the profit allocation is more reasonable and effective by comparing A-T value with Shapley value. The method fully stresses the special importance of player＇ s position in structure. In addition, the conclusion is illustrated by contrasting restricted alliance structure with different levels of profit allocation in supply chain.
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2018年第2期48-53,共6页
Operations Research and Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71572040
71601049)
福建省自然科学基金资助项目(2016J05169)
福建省社科规划项目(FJ2016C021)
福建省中青年教师教育科研项目(JAS160153)
福建农林大学"杰出青年科研人才"计划项目(xjq201635)
关键词
供应链合作创新
限制结盟
利润分配
A-T解
supply chain co- innovation
restricted alliance
profit distribution
A-T solution
