摘要
文章研究物流服务集成商与服务提供商之间的契约选择问题。综合考虑了物流服务供应链中存在的多代理人与双向道德风险问题,以及相关研究中多忽视的代理人之间竞争效应对其产出的影响。运用委托——代理理论,构建了更加契合物流服务供应链环境的收益共享契约和锦标赛契约的契约模型,基于优胜劣汰与合作共赢的视角,对比分析了二者在物流服务供应链中的激励效果,并以实际企业的数据进行了契约效果的检验。研究表明,在物流服务供应链中,锦标赛契约比收益共享契约效果更优:在激励方面,更能提高参与人的努力程度;在收益方面,实现了参与人收益的帕累托改进。
This paper analyses the contract choice strategy of logistics service supply chain between logistics service integrators and logistics service providers.Considering multi-agents,double-sided moral hazards exist in logistics service supply chain,and the effect of competition between agents on their output which is ignored by the existing research,by using principal-agent theory,based on the view point of competition and cooperation.Respectively constructs the revenue sharing contract model and the championship of the contract model,analyses the incentive effect of the both contracts in the logistics service supply chain comparatively and checks the effect of both contracts through practical enterprise data.The result shows that under the principal-agent environment of logistics service supply chain,compared to revenue-sharing contract,rank-order contract has better effect,such as improving the effort of the chain's members and achieving the participants' Pareto improvement.
出处
《工业技术经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2018年第2期99-106,共8页
Journal of Industrial Technological Economics
基金
电子商务与现代物流重庆市高校市级重点实验室开放基金项目(项目编号:ECML201410)
关键词
物流服务供应链
收益共享契约
锦标赛契约
委托——代理理论
集成商
服务提供商
logistics service supply chain
revenue-sharing contract
rank-order contract
principal-agent theory
integrators
service providers
