摘要
针对供应商主导的二级供应链,在供应商与零售商风险规避假设下,以CVa R为风险测度工具,建立了基于Stackelberg博弈的供应链回购契约模型,分析了供应商的最优决策,以及供应链成员的风险规避水平、批发价对订货量及供应链成员收益的影响,并与风险中性下的决策结果进行比较.研究表明,当批发价确定时,在不同的风险规避水平与批发价取值区间,供应商选择不同的回购策略;当批发价为决策变量时,供应商需要根据契约双方的风险规避水平设置批发价,并决定是否回购;与风险中性假设相比,风险规避假设对实践中供应商的决策行为提供了更合理的解释.
This paper establishes a buyback contract model based on Stackelberg game for the supplier dominated two-echelon supply chain with a risk-averse supplier and a risk-averse retailer by using CVa R.It analyzes the supplier's optimal decision,examines the impact of the members' risk-averse degree and the wholesale price on the order and the members' profits.The decision results are compared with the risk neutral decision results.The results show that the supplier chooses different repurchase strategies at different risk-averse levels and at wholesale price range when the wholesale price is definitive.When the wholesale price is a decision variable,the supplier needs to determine the wholesale price according to the risk-averse levels of the members and decide whether to adopt a return policy.Compared with the risk-neutral hypothesis,the risk-averse hypothesis provides a more reasonable explanation for the supplier's decision behavior in practice.
出处
《系统工程学报》
CSCD
北大核心
2017年第6期829-842,共14页
Journal of Systems Engineering
基金
国家社会科学基金资助项目(14BGL196)
湖南省自然科学基金资助项目(2015JJ2177)
湖南省社会科学基金智库专项重点资助项目(16ZWB40)
湖南省社会科学成果评审委员会资助项目(XSP17YBZC201)
