摘要
本文对企业并购中CEO的权力寻租行为进行了博弈分析,CEO与股东之间的利益博弈受企业控制权与剩余索取权制度安排的影响。当企业控制权与剩余索取权合一时,企业并购得以发生的充要条件就是帕累托最优的条件。当企业控制权与剩余索取权相分离时,企业的并购很可能偏离帕累托最优。将政府加入并购博弈中,CEO与政府官员很可能联合起来进行寻租,其寻租行为发生的概率取决于国家(股东)的监管效果和惩罚力度。
This paper analyzes the power rent-seeking behavior of CEO in M & A, and the interest game between CEO and shareholder is influenced by the institutional control and residual claim system arrangement. When the enterprise control and the residual claim right, the necessary conditions for the acquisition of the enterprise is Pareto optimal conditions. When corporate control is separated from residual claims, firm mergers are likely to deviate from Pareto optimism. When the government joins the M & A game, the CEO and the government officials are likely to join forces to rent, and the probability of their rent-seeking behavior depends on the regulatory and penalties of the state(shareholders).
出处
《财会通讯（中）》
北大核心
2017年第12期13-18,共6页
Communication of Finance and Accounting
基金
国家社科基金一般项目"放权改革
控制权配置与企业并购中CEO腐败的治理理论与实证研究"(项目编号:17BGL060)
安康学院校级项目陕南生态旅游环境审计研究(项目编号2016AYPYZX03)阶段性研究成果
