摘要
目前,我国工业污染控制与治理以末端处理为主,工业企业与地方政府及国家环境监管部门作为工业污染控制的主体,在治理污染的过程中利益相互交错。本文提出工业污染控制与治理应以污染物排放稳定达标、污染风险降低、环境利益成本最优、环境治理结构合理等多目标为导向,在深度剖析以发达国家为主的工业污染控制与治理策略的基础上,分析中国工业污染动态博弈主体及主体间损益决策树,明晰工业企业、政府环保监管部门、公众等环境利益主体的全概率决策情景,构建工业污染控制与治理风险控制模型,提出有效治理我国工业污染的创新思路。
Currently, the end-of-pipe treatment is still in the dominant position in the pollution control and treatment of China industries. As the principal parts in pollution control and treatment activities, industrial enterprises, local government and environment supervision sectors of the state, the interests of theirs have been linked, interlaced and interacted with each other in the process of conducting pollution control and treatment related activities. This paper proposes that industrial pollution control and treatment are guided by pollutant emissions steady and reaching standards, reduction of pollutants risk, optimised environmental interest costs and reasonable environmental treatment structure. This paper provides a model of industrial pollution control and treatment and risk assessment. The model is based on the investigation and deep analysis of the industrial pollution control and treatment Strategies of developed countries, associated with the study and analysis of the principal parts in China industrial pollution dynamic game and the profit and loss decision tree of them. The paper proposes an effective and innovative approach for industrial pollution control and treatment in China.
出处
《科技促进发展》
CSCD
2017年第8期615-623,共9页
Science & Technology for Development
基金
国家发改委全球环境基金(GEF)(编号:2014GJX14):中国气候变化技术需求评估项目(The GEF China Climate Technology Needs Assessment Project)
负责人:余红辉
关键词
工业污染
控制与治理
动态博弈
损益决策树
风险控制
industrial pollution
control and treatment
dynamic game
profit and loss decision tree
risk assessment
