摘要
2014年城乡居民养老保险实现了制度全覆盖,在自愿选择缴费档次的原则下90%农民选择最低缴费档次的行为严重制约着农民养老福利水平的提高,政府采取的财政补贴激励政策失灵。基于这种现实,构建了农民参保行为决策偏差的前景理论模型,以青年农民和中老年农民两类群体为考察对象,根据损失厌恶、参照依赖、敏感度递减等心理特性,揭示了农民参保行为偏差的响应机制。进而提出利用"可得性偏差"构建城乡居民养老保险的财政奖励机制;提高最低缴费档次,突破"锚定效应";突出框架效应的正面导向,提升城乡居保制度的绩效等政策建议。
The new rural endowment insurance has been the full coverage of system in 2012,but the behavior that the farmers choose the minimum premium grade restrains the improvement of pension benefit level.Meantime the government taking financial subsidies is failure.Based on this reality,farmers participating behavior decision biases of prospect theory model is constructed in this paper,taking young farmers and among rural adults in two groups as the object of study.According to psychological characteristics including loss aversion,reference dependence,diminishing sensitivity,this paper revealed the response mechanism of farmers' participating behavior deviation and further proposed some advice,including constructing the financial incentive mechanism of the new rural endowment insurance based on availability fallacy,improving the lowest pay grade to break the anchoring effect,and highlighting the positive orientation of the framework effect to improve the performance of the Urban and Rural Resident Endowment Insurance and so on.
出处
《河北大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》
北大核心
2017年第6期109-117,共9页
Journal of Hebei University(Philosophy and Social Science)
基金
2015年河北省教育厅重大攻关项目"京津冀协同发展的财税政策研究"
国家社科基金项目"农村新型养老保险全覆盖问题研究"(13BJY088)
第二批河北省百名优秀创新人才支持计划项目"河北省农村新型养老保险全覆盖问题研究"(BR2-244)
关键词
城乡居民养老保险
决策选择
行为偏差
前景理论
the urban and rural resident endowment insurance
decision choice
behavior bias
prospect theory
