摘要
为应对日趋凸显的环境污染问题,运动式执法已成为我国现阶段区域环境治理中频繁使用的治理工具。就规制实践而言,企业环境行为选择愈发显著的受到动态惩罚机制的刺激与激励;但在理论层面,该问题并未得到足够的关注。运用演化博弈理论深入探讨了动态监管机制下的企业环境遵从行为演化动态及其规制策略设计问题,以期为相关决策制定提供理论依据与政策建议。研究结果表明:在政府监管能力存在明显约束的条件下,精心设计的动态惩罚机制能够成为实现区域内企业环境遵从行为良好诱导与控制的有力工具;并且,相比模糊型动态惩罚机制,明确型动态惩罚机制能够取得更好的规制效果。然而,研究进一步发现,就我国现阶段国情而言,政府仍需将"如何走出‘两高一低’的困局"作为环境治理改革的关键性任务;同时,也需注重由运动式环境执法向常态式环境执法的转变。
In order to deal with serious environmental pollution problems, campaign-style enforcement has been frequently used in China＇s regional environmental governance. As a consequence, firm＇s environmental behavior is obviously stimulated and influenced by dynamic punishment in practice, which has not gotten sufficient attention in academics. We use evolutionary game theory to analyze the dynamic of firm＇s environmental compliance behavior and optimal design of regulatory choice under dynamic enforcement, to provide theoretical guide and policy recommendations for decision making process. The results show that dynamic punishment could be a useful tool for capacity-limited regulators to achieve an effective regulation of firm; s environmental behavior. Furthermore, compared with fuzzy dynamic punishment, clear dynamic punishment would achieve a better regulation effect. However, for China, the government still needs to figure out how to get out of the dilemma of ＂high compliance cost, high enforcement cost and low illegality cost; as a critical task of governance reform. In addition, the government should also pay attention to the transitions from campaign-style enforcement to normal enforcement.
出处
《系统管理学报》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2017年第6期1122-1130,共9页
Journal of Systems & Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71201071
71471076
71471077)
教育部人文社科研究规划基金资助项目(17YJAZH035)
江苏省"六大人才高峰"高层次人才培养项目(JNHB-018)
关键词
动态惩罚
演化博弈
企业环境遵从行为
规制策略
dynamic punishment
evolutionary game
firm＇ s environmental compliance behavior
regulatory choice
