摘要
随着人口流动变成社会常态,现行流动人口的统计和管理模式已不能适应时代的发展,无法实现对城市流动人口的有效统计。通过对流动人口、基层政府和地方政府的成本收益比较,并利用动态博弈理论对流动人口信息传递的过程进行分析,我们发现:进行信息登记之后,流动人口在城市中能够实际获得的社会公共服务较少,但却面临较高的支付成本,流动人口在权衡自己的成本收益后并不会选择主动登记信息;而由于绩效考核方式的制约,基层政府也存在隐瞒流动人口信息的可能性。因此,流动人口与基层政府之间、基层政府与地方政府之间的利益冲突是流动人口信息失真的根本原因。解决这一问题的突破口在于引入第三方的统计机构,实现流动人口管理向流动人口服务的演进。
With the increasing of population movement, the current model of the floating population statistics can not achieve the effective result. The paper analyzes this problem with the comparison of the floating population, grass-roots government and local government＇s cost-benefit by the method of game theory.The result shows that the floating population who can acquire less social public service and pay more after registering the information in the city, will not choose to register their information actively. In addition,due to the restriction of performance appraisal methods, the grass-roots government also has the intention to conceal the floating population information. The conflict between the floating population and the grassroots government, and between the grass-roots government and the local government are the main reasons of information distortion. The introduction of third-party statistical institutions, and switching government functions from administration to service are the breakthrough of the information statistics of the floating population.
出处
《社会政策研究》
2017年第4期70-81,共12页
Social Policy Research
关键词
流动人口统计
利益冲突
博弈分析
Floating population statistics, Conflicl of interest, Game analysis
