摘要
是不是只要政府予以企业保护就一定会导致产能过剩?针对此问题文章建立了一个简明的理论模型,并运用固定效应模型、倾向得分匹配法以及事件冲击DID方法进行了实证检验,探究了地方政府在"官员晋升锦标赛"体制下运用财政补贴,与中央政府的产业鼓励政策一起给企业提供双重政策保护,从而导致产能过剩的整个机制。结论表明:(1)单一的政策保护并不会引发严重的产能过剩,中央政府的产业鼓励政策和地方政府的财政补贴政策的双重叠加才是导致产能过剩的真正原因;(2)当中央政府明确经济增长任务后,那些所在地政府迅速推出地方版财政刺激计划的企业更容易发生产能过剩;(3)相比较而言,双重保护的效果在国有企业中更为明显。
Owing to the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008,the world economy suffers an unprecedented impact.In order to stabilize the economy,the central government of China launches a ＂four trillion＂industrial revitalization plan,and clearly puts forward the economic growth target of 8 percent.In this situation,Chinese various local governments have launched their own supporting fiscal stimulus plans,making the final stimulus funds reach a staggering 20 trillion. The central and local governments＇ double protection policy really makes a lot of enterprises resume production and stabilizes the employment in the short term.However,in the long term such a policy undermines the allocation function of market mechanism.A lotof resources have flowed into the central enterprises and state-owned enterprises,which severely crowds out investment and consumption of private enterprises and individuals.From 2010 when the State Council issued Notice of Further Strengthening the Work of Eliminating Backward Production Capacity to the December 2016 when the central economic work conference stressed again the importance of＂removing capacity＂,overcapacity has become an urgent problem to be solved in Chinese comprehensively deepening reform. There have been a lot of researches on overcapacity in academia,and most of them emphasize excessive government intervention as the most important factor.However,some scholars suggest the government guidance in the light of a general trend is an important basis for social development and progress.So,is it true that government protection is bound to lead to overcapacity？Or does the unreasonable degree and frequency of protection really account for this？Based on this thinking,this paper takes＂official promotion tournament＂system as the basic framework,and depicts a whole policy effect mechanism in which the central government raises the test weight of economic growth,then the local governments increase fiscal subsidies and finally enterprises expand production,thereby leading
作者
顾振华
陈强远
Gu Zhenhua Chen Qiangyuan(School of Business Economics, Shanghai Business School, Shanghai 201400, China School of Economics, Shanghai University, Shanghai 200444, China)
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第11期84-97,共14页
Journal of Finance and Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71573171)
上海市哲学社会科学青年项目(2016EJB001)
关键词
双重政策保护
产能过剩
官员晋升锦标赛
财政补贴
产业鼓励政策
double policy protection
overcapacity
offical promotion tournament
fiscal subsidy
industrial-incentive policy
