摘要
实证检验了官员视察会计师事务所对审计收费的影响。研究发现,官员视察提高了会计师事务所的审计收费水平;进一步研究发现,与非本地官员相比,本地官员视察会计师事务所对审计收费的影响更大。研究基于政治关联的资源引入功能视角进行分析,考察政府"帮助之手"对会计师事务所议价能力的提升作用,拓展了政治关联经济后果和审计收费影响因素领域的文献。
This paper examines the effect of the political visits on the audit fees of accounting firms. The result finds that political visits have raised the audit fee level of ac- counting firms. Further study shows that local officials are more influential than the non- local officials on audit fees. Based on the analysis of the function of the political connection, this paper tests the role of the helping hand of government in enhancing the bargaining power of accounting firms and expands the literature on the economic consequences of political connections and the influencing factors on audit fees.
作者
张雯
刘耀淞
张敏
杨会丽
Wen Zhang Yaosong Liu Min Zhang Huili Yang(School of Economics and Management, Beijing Information Science and Technology University, Beijing 100192, China School of Business, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China)
出处
《会计与经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第3期3-17,共15页
Accounting and Economics Research
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究项目(15YJC790147
15YJA630101)
国家自然科学基金项目(71672188)
国家社会科学基金项目(17CJY068)
关键词
官员视察
审计收费
本地官员
political visits
audit fees
local officials
