摘要
农户签约或违约与否,关键在于契约安排能否满足其偏好。来自安徽省砀山县果农及混合Logit模型的证据表明,农户对签约表现出强偏好,并且相比于龙头企业,农户更偏向于与合作社签约;向农户提供种植技术、市场信息、农资集体采购等服务难以提高农户效用。尽管如此,农户对签订契约及上述契约安排的偏好呈异质性,并且基础设施条件、果农风险偏好及家庭劳动力禀赋的差异是农户偏好异质性的重要来源。此外,保底价+随行就市、预付部分果品收购款的契约安排不能实现农户效用的明显改善,合同固定价格条款则会显著降低农户效用。针对目前我国农业产业化进程中签约农户比重依然偏低以及已签约农户违约率长期居高不下的困境,可重点从两个方面寻求突破:第一,呼吁农民合作组织的介入,实现产业组织模式的创新;第二,科学合理地设计契约(合同)条款,提高农户签约的积极性。
Agricultural industrialization is the basic outlet and essential path to realize agricultural modernization. Abundant practical experience reveals that signing commodity contract is an effective way for smallholders to attend the process of agricultural industrialization. Therefore, investigating the behavior logic of farmers signing commodity contract is of vital importance. For over a decade, though researchers have focused on the issue and investigated smallholders＇ behavior from various perspectives, the results have not reached agreement. Furthermore, few researchers give attention to contract arrangements and farmers＇ preferences. In fact, not considering contractual arrangements means ignoring the heterogeneity of contracts, and overlooking the relation between contractual arrangements and smallholders＇ preferences also makes it difficult to understand smallholders＇ behavior mechanism of signing commodity contract. This paper extends previous studies by treating contracts as the combinations of contractual arrangements, and putting forward the point that smallholders＇ decision to sign a contract or not depends on whether the contractual arrangements can satisfy their preferences. Then we use choice experiment to investigate contractual arrangements, smallholders＇ preferences and their relationships. Based on the data collected among fruit farmers in Dangshan County, Anhui Provence, and the results of mixed logit models, we find that： There is a general preference for marketing options that involve a contract, and signing a contract with farmer cooperatives is much more preferred by smallholders to that with leading firms. Besides, offering services, such as technical assistance, market information and inputs provision cannot increase farmers＇ utilities. Despite all that, farmers＇ preferences for signing a contract and the arrangements mentioned above are heterogeneous since their available infrastructure, risk attitudes and labor endowments are different. Additionally, prearranging price
出处
《浙江大学学报（人文社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第4期143-158,共16页
Journal of Zhejiang University:Humanities and Social Sciences
基金
国家自然科学基金农林经济管理学科群重点项目(71333011)
清华大学中国农村研究院博士论文奖学金项目
关键词
契约安排
农户偏好
偏好异质性
选择实验法
混合Logit模型
contractual arrangements
smallholders＇ preference
heterogeneous preference
choice experiment
mixed logit model
