摘要
本文基于会计信息披露视角,考察了产权异质条件下大股东认购行为对定向增发折价的作用后果和机理。研究发现:相对于国有企业,民营企业大股东通过低价认购定向增发股份进行了自我利益输送;在原有定向增发价格形成机制下,无论是负向应计盈余管理还是真实盈余管理均会造成定向增发折价;真实盈余管理已经取代了应计盈余管理成为大股东在定向增发中进行利润操纵的主要手段;负向真实盈余管理在民营企业大股东认购定向增发股份和高折价之间发挥了中介效应。
In the direction of accounting information disclosure, this paper examines the effect and mechanism of the behavior of large shareholders＇ subscription on the discount of private placement under the heterogeneous property. The research shows that compared with the state-owned enterprises, the large shareholders of private enterprises carry out the benefits of transportation through low-cost subscription directional issuance of shares. Under the existing private place- ment price formation mechanism, both the negative and the real earnings management will result in the private placement discount. Real earnings management has replaced the accrual earnings management as the main means of profit manipu- lation of large shareholders in the private placement. Negative real earnings management has played an intermediary effect between large shareholders of private enterprises subscription and high discount.
出处
《预测》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第4期50-55,62,共7页
Forecasting
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71672057
71302042)
关键词
大股东认购
产权异质
定向增发折价
真实盈余管理
large shareholders
property heterogeneity
private placement discount
real earnings management activities
