摘要
目前,有关双边市场理论的研究多在单期博弈模型中展开,并未在多期的情况下考虑平台的动态定价问题.显然,这与两边用户总是在平台中展开多次交易,平台总是面临动态定价的客观现实相违背.基于此,本文构建了一个双寡头两期动态博弈模型,通过引入用户满意度,研究了双边平台在不同定价策略(统一定价策略和歧视定价策略)和不同战略(短期战略和长期战略)情形下的最优定价,比较了策略间和战略间的差异性和有效性.研究发现:第一期获得较大市场份额并不能保证平台在第二期竞争中占据优势地位,也不能保证获得较高重复购买率;歧视定价策略比统一定价策略更有利于平台获得较高利润,而不利于两边用户效用和社会福利水平的提升;(歧视定价策略,歧视定价策略)是帕累托上策均衡解;两期社会福利总水平仅仅与平台的定价策略有关,而与平台的战略无关.
Recent literature on two-sided market theory mainly focuses on single-period game theory, and omits dynamic pricing in multi-period games. This disagrees with the reality that agents always make multiple transactions and that platforms face dynamic pricing. After building a two-sided duopoly platforms model con- sidering consumer satisfaction, the paper analyzes the optimal prices under different pricing strategies （ uniform pricing or discrimination pricing） and different strategic targets （short-term profits or long-term profits）, and then discusses their applicability and validity. It is found that a higher first-period market share can ensure neither a higher second-period market share nor the repeated purchase ratio; Discrimination pricing strategy is good for the platform＇ s profit, but bad for agents＇ utility and social welfare. （ Discrimination pricing, Discrimination pricing） strategy is a Pareto-dominant equilibrium, and the total social welfare of the two periods is not related to the platform＇s strategic target, but related to its pricing strategy.
作者
张凯
李华琛
刘维奇
ZHANG Kai LI Hua-chen LIU Wei-qi(Institute of Management and Decision,Shanxi University, Taiyuan 030006, China School of Economics and Management, Shanxi University, Taiyuan 030006, China Faculty of Finance and Banking, Shanxi University of Finance and Economics, Taiyuan 030006, China)
出处
《管理科学学报》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2017年第6期42-63,共22页
Journal of Management Sciences in China
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71102118)
中国博士后基金特别资助项目(2014T70232)
中国博士后基金面上资助项目(2013M530890)
山西省高等学校优秀青年学术带头人资助项目(2015050025)
山西省归国留学人员科研资助项目(2015-024)
山西省高等学校"131"领军人才工程资助项目(2016052007)
