摘要
不完全合同背景下,产权分配在参与方的投资决策中至关重要。利用产权理论讨论了研发合作中的序贯投资决策和创新的产权分配问题。研究表明,最优产权结构随着参与方的谈判力变动,谈判力较低的一方单独拥有产权能够平衡其投资积极性;随着投资关系专用性程度的增加,最优产权为联合产权在产品开发者谈判力区间的范围更广。为了提高双方合作效率,可考虑采用由一个产品开发者出价并按照研究单位投资积极性分配初始产权的期权合同。比较分析发现:期权合同能够缓解投资不足问题,并进一步提高双方合作效率。
In an environment with contractual incompleteness, ownership allocation is important in the R＆D partnership.This paper uses the property right approach to explore the ownership structure of innovation and investment scenario where two parties invest sequentially. The results show that optimal ownership structure varipower,and sole ownership by the parties whose bargaining power is relative low can balance theirThe range of joint ownership based on marketers bargaining power is increase with relationship-specificity. For an efficien-cy improvement,we consider an option contract that allocates the ownership according the researcher＇s investment incentive initially, and the marketer has the right to make the offer of option price. The results of comparisontract can mitigate underinvestment problem to improve the total surplus.
出处
《科技进步与对策》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第12期1-7,共7页
Science & Technology Progress and Policy
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(15XZZ011)
关键词
产权结构
序贯投资
期权合同
研发合作
不完全合同
Ownership Structure
Sequential Investments
Option Contract
R＆-D Partnership
Incomplete Contracts
