摘要
目的:探讨我国医疗市场供方道德风险的约束机制。方法:建立以医生、患者和政府为参与主体的4阶段动态博弈模型,分析政府监管的有效性和医生以及患者预期利润的影响因素。结果:在其他条件不变的情况下,政府监管有效的概率会随着过度医疗所取得的利润增加而提高,但会随着对医生惩罚成本的增大和医生声誉价值的增加而降低;在医生进行合理医疗的概率给定时,医生预期利润将随着合理医疗所获利润值和医生声誉值的增加而增加;患者预期利润将随着医生合理医疗时自身所得收益值的增加而增加,但会随着过度医疗值的增加而减少。结论:我国公立医院供方道德风险有效的约束机制在于放松价格管制,提高医疗服务的市场价值,同时要形成有效的医生声誉激励机制,并在促进各方激励相容的基础上降低政府监管成本,完善政府的监管。
Objective： To discuss the constraint mechanism of mural hazard from the supply side in the medical market of China. Methods： It analyzed the effectiveness of government regulation and of the influencing factors of the doctors and patients expected profits through the establishment 4 stage dynamic game model involved the doctors, patients and the government as the subject. Resuits： In the case of other cunditions unchanged, the effeetive probability of gnvernment regulation would increase with the increase of profits made by excessive medical treatment, but would decrease with the increase of doctor＇s punishment cost and the increase of doctor＇s reputation value. Given the reasonable probability about medical treatment, the doctor＇s expected profits would increase with the increase of the value of a reasonable medical gain and doctor＇ s reputation increase. The prospective prufits of patients would in- crease as the doctor＇s profits increased, but decrease with the over-increased medical treatment. Conclusion： The effective restraint mechanism of moral hazard from the supply side of public hospitals in China included relax the price contrul, improve the market val- ue of medical services, form effective doctor reputation incentive mechanism, reduce government supervision costs and improve government regulation on the basis of prnmoting incentive compatibility. Key words public hospital; moral hazard of the supply side; constraint mechanism; dynamic gaming model
出处
《中国卫生经济》
北大核心
2017年第6期20-22,共3页
Chinese Health Economics
基金
宁夏自治区重点研发计划资助项目(软科学)
宁夏医科大学校级科研资助项目(XZ2016003)
关键词
公立医院
供方道德风险
约束机制
动态博弈模型
public hospital
moral hazard of the supply side
constraint mechanism
dynamic gaming model
