摘要
企业通过横向并购能够实现规模经济或范围经济,降低交易成本,但同时也可能导致排除、限制竞争的效果。威廉姆森(Williamson)首先提出评价横向并购的核心问题是如何在并购可能导致的效率收益和市场支配力增长之间进行权衡。美国司法部和联邦贸易委员会2010年发布的《横向合并指南》认为,效率应当是可认知的、合并所特有的且不带有模糊性和推测性的效率;欧盟委员会2004年《横向合并指南》认为成功的效率辩护必须具备三个条件,一是给消费者带来实际利益,二是并购所特有,三是能够被欧盟委员会所证实。美、欧执法机构虽然在并购反垄断审查中逐步重视效率因素的考量,但至今尚无案例显示成功的效率抗辩使一项可能具有反竞争效果的并购交易得以批准。中国执法机构应当认识到效率考量的必要性和重要性,确立社会总福利的效率衡量标准,探索针对效率的经济学分析框架。
Merging parties may achieve scale economies and scope economies, and reduce the transaction cost as a result of the horizontal merger, but the merger may also create eliminative or restrictive impact on competition. Oliver Williamson first proposed a welfare tradeoff model of efficiency benefits and the enhancement of market dominant position in 1968. According to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued by U. S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission in 2010, the agencies credit only those cognizable and merger-specific efficiencies, and vague and speculative efficiency effects will not be considered. Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers issued by the European Commission in 2004 stated that the Commission would only take account of efficiency claims which have to benefit consumers, be merger-specific and be verifiable. Although the competition agencies from the US and European jurisdictions consider the efficiency impact in the merger review gradually, there is almost no case where the successful efficiency defense reverses the decision of blocking an anticompetitive transaction. Therefore, Chinese competition authorities should realize the importance and necessity of efficiency analysis in the anti-monopoly review. The efficiency should be justified under social total welfare criteria, and the appropriate economic approach to analyze efficiency effects must be explored.
出处
《经济与管理研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第6期74-83,共10页
Research on Economics and Management
关键词
横向并购
反垄断审查
效率权衡
horizontal merger
anti-monopoly review
efficiency tradeoff
