摘要
在中央苏区反"围剿"问题上,共产国际执委会和中共中央最初主张优先考虑保存红军有生力量,必要时可以撤离苏区。随着连续两次反"围剿"斗争的胜利,远东局和中共中央出现"左"的情绪,基本不再考虑转移的方案,并与共产国际执委会发生分歧。因此,第五次反"围剿"战争是在没有战略转移预案的背景下开始的。当红军遭受严重损失后,远东局和中共中央被迫考虑准备进行战略转移,并与共产国际执委会达成共识。但是,共产国际执委会和远东局都希望通过1934年夏季的军事行动来反败为胜,导致中共中央迟迟不能下决心实施转移。另外,共产国际执委会和中共中央着力经营四川、陕西,进而发展西北苏区的思路,也深刻影响了中央红军战略转移方向的最终选择。
With respect to the issue of the ＂Campaign against Encirclement and Suppression＂ in the Central Soviet Area, the Comintern Executive Committee and the Central Committee of the CPC initially advocated placing priority on preserving the strength of the Red Army and, if necessary, withdrawing from the soviet area. With the victory of two consecutive ＂Campaigns against Encirclement and Suppression,＂ a ＂Leftist＂ mood became prominent in the Far Eastern Bureau and the Central Committee of the CPC, and thus they basically no longer contemplated a strategic transfer program and they disagreed with the Comintern Executive Committee. Therefore, the fifth ＂Cam- paign against Encirclement and Suppression＂ began in the absence of a strategic transfer plan. After the Red Ar- my suffered heavy losses, the Far Eastern Bureau and the Central Committee of the CPC were forced to make preparations for a strategic shift, and they reached a consensus with the Comintern Executive Committee. Howev- er, in the summer of 1934 the Comintern Executive Committee and the Far Eastern Bureau were hoping to turn the defeat into a victory through military action and, as a result, the Central Committee of the CPC did not contem- plate a strategic transfer. In addition, the ideas of the Communist International Executive Committee and the CPC Central Committee, focusing on Sichuan, Shaanxi, and then on developing the Northwest Soviet area, also had a profound impact on the final choice in terms of a strategic shift in the direction of the Central Red Army.
出处
《中共党史研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第4期18-29,共12页
CPC History Studies
基金
国家社科基金项目"共产国际远东局与中国革命关系研究"(16BDJ007)的阶段性成果
