摘要
基于中国信用债券市场的违约事件,本文研究发现:涉事评级机构不仅没有因为涉及债券违约事件而收紧信用评级标准,反而更加高估企业的信用评级水平,并且涉及的债券违约事件越多,高估信用评级的程度越大。但投资者通过"用脚投票"方式惩罚了涉事评级机构,导致其市场份额相对于非涉事评级机构出现显著下降或者增长较低的态势,同时涉事评级机构的信用评级意见对于降低企业融资成本的作用显著降低。
Based on the bond defaults happened in China, the paper empirically finds that the CRAs involving in bond defaults are more likely to overestimate the level of corporate credit rating after the event of default in order to enlarge their market shares. However, despise the opportunistic behavior of those CRAs, their market share indeed shrinks due to their involvement in those bond defaults since bond investors and issuers punish those CRAs. Moreover, the creditability of credit rating given by those CRAs is also in query that the impact of credit rating on bond financing cost also becomes smaller.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第3期130-144,共15页
Journal of Financial Research
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71302023
71372047)
北京市哲学社会科学规划项目(13JGB010)的资助
