摘要
本文认为P2P网络借贷市场具有垄断竞争的市场特征,作为借贷产品的供给者,借款者的行为直接影响其产品的竞争绩效。基于信号传递和信号甄别模型的研究发现,在信息不对称的情况下,借款者需随产品潜在风险的增加而传递更具体的信息,从而提高投资者的综合评价。进一步研究表明,硬信息是投资者信息甄别的基础,但软信息将有助于提高产品竞争绩效。
This paper believes that the P2P Lending market demonstrates the characteristics of imperfect competi- tion. As the supplier of lending products, the behavior of the borrowers directly affect the competitive performance of its products. Based on the Signaling Model and Screening Model, in order to improve the comprehensive evaluation of investors, borrowers need to transmit more specific information with potential risks increasing under the circumstances of asymmetric information. Further research shows that the ＂Hard Information＂ is the basis of investor information screening, but the ＂Soft Information＂ will help improve competitive performance of P2P Lending.
作者
黄玲
崔琪
尼安木
Huang Ling Cui Qi Ni Anmu(College of Finance＆Economics, Chongqing Three Gorges University, Chongqing Wanzhou 4041009 School of Economics＆Management, Southeast University, Jiangsu Nanjing 211189)
出处
《金融发展研究》
北大核心
2017年第4期47-54,共8页
Journal Of Financial Development Research
基金
重庆市社会科学规划培育项目(2016PY68)
重庆市教委科学技术研究项目(KJ1601030)
重庆三峡学院重大培育项目(16PY05)的阶段性成果
