摘要
本文采用93个国家共4 498家商业银行的数据,研究监管质量、政治法律制度环境对商业银行风险承担的影响。研究发现:第一,监管质量的提升在总体上确实抑制了商业银行的道德风险,使得商业银行降低了其风险承担。第二,健全的法律制度环境有效地降低了商业银行的风险承担,但单一的政治制度环境因素并未如预期般抑制或约束商业银行风险承担,反而使其承担更多的风险。第三,监管当局对商业银行经营设置过于苛刻的监管要求并配套相应的政治法律制度环境,会提高商业银行的风险承担。
In this paper, the data of 4 498 commercial banks in 93 countries are used for a research on the influence of supervision quality, political and legal environment on the risk-taking of commercial banks. It＇s found that, first, the im- provement in supervision quality has indeed inhibited the moral hazards of commercial banks as a whole, and reduce the risk-taking of commercial banks; second, the sound legal-system environment effectively reduces the risk-taking of commercial banks, but a single factor of political-system environment doesn＇t inhibit or restrict the risk-taking of commercial banks as it＇s expected, and leads to more risk-taking on the contrary; third, if the the regulatory authorities set up too severe regulatory requirements and supporting political and legal environment for the commercial banks, the risk-taking of commercial banks will rise.
作者
段军山
肖友生
DUAN Jun-shan XIAO You-sheng
出处
《金融论坛》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第3期19-36,共18页
Finance Forum
基金
广东省自然科学基金项目(2014A030313607)
广东省哲学社会科学规划项目(GD14HLJ01)
关键词
商业银行
风险承担
监管质量
政治法律制度
固定效应模型
commercial bank
risk-taking
regulatory quality
political and legal system
fixed-effect model
