摘要
传统的网络攻防博弈模型均没有考虑对网络攻击方攻击行为的惩罚,为此提出考虑第三方动态惩罚的网络攻防演化博弈模型,通过计算网络中攻防双方的复制动态方程,分析攻防双方对应的演化稳定策略,为网络防御方提供最优安全投资策略。理论分析和仿真结果表明,加入第三方动态惩罚因素可以降低防御方的最优安全投资水平,提高其安全投资回报,有利于整个网络的安全,研究结果可为网络安全的综合防御提供理论指导和技术支撑。
Since the traditional cyber offender-defender game model ignores the punishment for attac king behavior in the modeling process,an offender-defender game model with the third-part dynamic penalty factor was proposed.To analyze the evolutionarily stable strategy of both offender and defender,replicator dynamics of the evolution system were calculated,which provided optimal security investment strategy for the cyber defender.The theoretical analysis and experimental results demonstrate that,in comparison with the model before,the optimal level of safety investment of the defender reduces and the security investment return increases after introducing the third-part dynamic penalty factor,which benefits the safety of the whole network.The results can provide theoretical guidance and technical support for the integrated defense of network security.
出处
《计算机工程与设计》
北大核心
2017年第3期611-615,共5页
Computer Engineering and Design
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(61379125)
关键词
网络安全
演化博弈模型
动态惩罚
最优安全投资
安全投资回报
network security
evolutionary game model
dynamic penalty
optimal security investment
return on security investment（ROSI）
