摘要
研究了规模不经济对制造商直销渠道选择的影响。运用博弈论建立了单渠道和双渠道供应链决策模型,得到了Bertrand均衡的渠道价格以及制造商和零售商最优利润。研究发现当零售商潜在市场份额较小时,若制造商规模不经济不明显,制造商开通直销渠道;若制造商规模不经济明显,制造商不开通直销渠道。当零售商潜在市场份额较大时,制造商不开通直销渠道。此外,直销渠道总是侵蚀零售商利润。
This paper studies the effects of manufacturer＇s scale diseconomies on the choice of the manufacturer launching online direct channel. In the symmetric-information framework, the manufacturer＇ S scale diseconomies Bertrand models are proposed between single-channel and dual-channel supply chains. The optimal prices and profits are compared between single-channel and dual-channel supply chains of Stackelberg competition. This paper demonstrates three interesting results： （i） when the retailer has less market shares and the manufacturer＇ s production exhibits its low diseconomies of scale, the manufacturersr decides to launch online direct channel in order to increase profits. （ ii ） if the retailer has less market shares but the manufacturer＇ s production exhibits its high diseconomies of scale, the manufacturer declines to launch online direct channel. （ iii） only if the retailer has more market shares, the manufacturer declines to launch online direct channel. In addition, the retailer＇ s profit always decreases while the manufacturer launches online direct channel
作者
聂佳佳
石纯来
NIE Jia-jia SHI Chun-lai(School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031, China)
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2017年第2期68-75,共8页
Operations Research and Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71101120
71440016)
四川省软科学研究计划资助项目(2015ZR0217)
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(2682014CX114)
关键词
供应链
直销渠道
主从博弈
规模不经济
supply chain
online direct channel
bertrand game
diseconomies
