摘要
基于减排框架,本文分别引入研发补贴政策、研发卡特尔(简称"R&D卡特尔")、竞争研发联盟(简称"RJV竞争")及卡特尔研发联盟(简称"RJV卡特尔")等四种技术政策,构建了一个多阶段博弈模型,研究单一技术政策、技术组合政策情形下双寡头企业减排研发绩效、利润及社会福利水平,并进一步利用数值模拟方法探讨政府和企业最优的技术政策选择,政府和企业最优技术政策选择结果的差异及其影响因素。研究结论表明:首先,从政府角度来看,组合政策的效果总是相对优于单一技术政策,并且政府最优的技术政策选择为RJV卡特尔与补贴组合政策。其次,无论溢出率取何值,政府和企业最优的技术政策选择都是一致的。最后,排污税取值影响政府和企业最优技术选择的一致性,当排污税较小时,企业最优的技术政策选择为RJV竞争与补贴组合政策(或RJV竞争政策);当排污税较大时,企业最优的技术选择为单一的技术政策。为了使政府和企业的最优技术政策选择一致,政府应选择一个合适的排污税。
Based on the abatement framework, this paper introduces four kinds of technology policies（ R＆D subsidy policy, R＆D cartel, RJV competition and RJV cartel） , and builds a multi-stage game model to study the effect of single technology policy and technology policies combination on firm abatement performance and social welfare. Moreover, numerical simulation method is used to study the optimal technology policy choice of govern- ment and firm. The results show that government~ optimal technology policy choice is RJV cartel and subsidies combination policy. Regardless of spillovers, the optimal technology policy choice of the government and firm is the same. The pollution tax affects the optimal technology policy choice of the government and firm. When pollu- tion tax is small, firm optimal technology policies choice is RJV competition and subsidy combination policy; when pollution tax is larger, the firm best technology choice is single policy. In order to make the choice of the government and firm consistency, the government should choose an optimal pollution tax.
作者
李冬冬
杨晶玉
LI Dong-dong YANG Jing-yu(School of Management,Xi＇an Jiaotong University, Xi＇ an 710049, China)
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2017年第2期9-16,83,共9页
Operations Research and Management Science
基金
基金项目:<胶州市排污权有偿使用和交易机制设计研究>(2014S060)
关键词
减排研发
溢出率
补贴政策
排污税
研发合作
abatement R＆D
spillovers rate
subsidy policy
emission tax
R＆D cooperation
