摘要
钟磊最近发表的一篇论文提出,伍德瓦德的干预主义(interventionism)因果理论预言没有向上、向下因果关系,因此可以拒绝金在权关于心物因果关系的排斥论证,保留心智属性的独立因果效力。本文就钟磊对伍德瓦德的干预主义的理解以及钟磊的论证策略提出几点疑问,与钟磊商榷。本文还提出,用因果理论来反驳金在权的排斥论证这种一般性策略很难有说服力。
In a recent paper, Zhong Lei argues that the interventionist theory of causation proposed by Woodward predicts that there is no upward or downward causation, therefore the theory can help to block Kim＇s exclusion argument on mental causation and keep independent causal powers for mental properties. This paper raises a few objections to Zhong Lei＇s understanding of Woodward＇s interventionism. I will also argue that the general strategy of rejecting Kim＇s exclusion argument by resorting to a theory of causation is unlikely to be convincing.
出处
《自然辩证法通讯》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第1期11-20,共10页
Journal of Dialectics of Nature
基金
国家社科基金项目"当代物理主义世界观研究"(项目编号:14BZX115)
关键词
心物因果性
因果理论
心智哲学
分析哲学
Mental causation
Theory of causation
Philosophy of mind
Analytic philosophy
