摘要
公司诉讼是影响企业正常经营的非常规事件,不仅可能造成财务损失,还可能影响企业声誉,导致客户流失以及后续融资等诸多问题,因此对公司诉讼风险影响因素的研究有重要意义。基于公司治理文献,本文以2007—2014年中国A股上市公司为初始研究样本,运用倾向得分匹配方法(PSM)分析了大股东持股对公司诉讼风险的影响。研究发现:(1)随着第一大股东持股比例的提高,公司诉讼风险显著降低。(2)随着公司可见性程度的提高,大股东降低公司诉讼风险的作用减弱。也就是说,相较于公司可见性高的企业,大股东在公司可见性低的企业中降低公司诉讼风险的作用更强。(3)相对于股权制衡公司,非股权制衡公司的大股东持股比例降低公司诉讼风险的效应更强。本文不仅深化了公司诉讼风险影响因素研究,而且有助于进一步拓展大股东在公司治理以及风险控制中的作用,对于理解大股东在防范公司诉讼风险方面的作用具有重要意义。
Firms' engagement in litigation is an unusual incident which might incur not only serious financial losses but also several problems such as damage of firm reputation, losses of customers and the difficulty in future financing. Therefore, the research of the factors influencing firm litigation risks has great significance. Based on the literature of corporate governance, this paper takes the A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2014 as the initial sample, and employs propensity score matching method to analyze the effect of the shareholding of large blockholders on firm litigation risks. It comes to the conclusions as follows: firstly, with the increase in the shareholding proportion of the first largest blockholder, firm litigation risks significantly reduce; secondly, with the rise in firm visibility, the role of large blockholders in the reduction in firm litigation risks weakens, that is to say, compared with firms with higher visibility, the role of large blockholders in the reduction in firm litigation risks is stronger in firms with lower visibility; thirdly, compared with companies with blockholder counterbalance, the role of large blockholders in the reduction in firm litigation risks is stronger in companies without blockholder counterbalance. It not only deepens the research of the factors influencing firm litigation risks, but also further extends the role of large blockholders in corporate governance and risk control; and it is of great significance to the understanding of the role of large blockholders in the prevention of firm litigation risks.
出处
《外国经济与管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第1期84-95,共12页
Foreign Economics & Management
基金
2015年上海财经大学研究生创新基金项目(CXJJ-2015-326)
关键词
大股东持股
公司诉讼风险
公司可见性
股权制衡
shareholding of large blockholders
firm litigation risk
firm visibility
blockholder counterbalance