摘要
本文以中组部2013年18号文件颁布为契机,分析了不同控股权性质的上市公司中,具有政府官员背景的独立董事(以下简称官员独董)及其辞职对上市公司股票价值的影响。本文以312家涉及独董辞职的公司为样本,发现与国有控股上市公司相比,聘请官员独董的民营控股上市公司(1)支付的现金股利水平更高;(2)官员独董辞职后股票价值下降的幅度更大。本文的研究结果表明,上市公司通过聘用官员独董获得政治资源,而官员独董同时也会要求上市公司积极响应政府发展资本市场的要求,间接地保护中小股东的利益。
This paper focuses on the 18^th document in 2013 issued by the Organization Department of the Central Committee of the CPC, and analyzes the potential impact on stock prices of listed companies caused by the consequent resignations of politically - connected independent directors. This paper works on 312 samples of independent director resignations after the issue of the document, and finds that （ 1 ） Private firms that hire politicallyconnected independent directors have higher dividend payout ratio, ceteris paribus, which implies that the politically - connected independent directors not only provide the political resources but also improve the level of investor protection; （2） It did impair the market value of companies, especially for those private enterprises, the first time a resignation announcement was explicitly related to the 18^th document. Our findings show that firms obtain political resources by hiring politically -connected independent directors,while politically -connected independent directors urge firms to follow the capital market rules, which improves the level of investor protection.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第12期128-142,共15页
Journal of Financial Research
基金
国家自然科学基金重点项目"互联网时代企业的财务行为与治理特征"(71632006)的阶段性研究成果
国家自然科学基金项目"国有企业绩效考核体系:改革及其经济后果"(71272008)
教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地项目资助(14JJD630005)
上海市教育委员会课题(2014111143)资助
关键词
独立董事
政治关系
投资者保护
公司价值
Independent Directors, Political Connections, Investor Protection, Firm Value
