摘要
面对地方政府对土地的饥渴及由此引发的农地减少、社会不稳定等并发症,中央政府的管治是否有效?本文对1947至2012年间中央制定的土地利用政策法规进行制度分析,揭示了治理目标、决策主体、决策机制随社会经济的发展而不断演变的特征。分析结果表明,在缺乏公众和社会组织(CSO)自下而上的参与和监督的情况下,中央采用自上而下的治理模式无法有效地治疗地方的土地综合症。公众参与土地利用决策的制度化程度低和城乡二元结构普遍存在的现状降低了农民在体制内平等参与经济和社会生活的机会,因此他们对地方政府的信任不足,甚至与其发生激烈冲突。由此,中央政府不仅需要控制地方政府在土地利用决策制定方面的自由裁量权,同时也应赋权公众对地方政府的土地利用决策进行问责。
This paper aims to fill the void in the literature by answering the following research question. to what extent has public participation been institutionalized in land use decision-making in China？ With focus on the purposes, actors, and architecture and mechanisms of public participation and government accountability, an institutional analysis is conducted on the national land use regulations and policies enacted between 1947 and 2012. It is found that without institutionalized input and surveillance from bottom-up by individual citizens and/or Civil Society Organizations （CSOs）, the top-down approaches remain ineffective and land use is mainly left for manipulation by local governments. The rural-urban dichotomy and lack of institutionalized public participation in land use decision-making have compromised equal economic and social opportunity for farmers, eroded public trust in local governments, and led to social unrest. Thus, the central government needs not only to directly control the discharge of discretionary power by local governments, but also to empower the public for holding the government accountable for land use decisions.
出处
《中国地质大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第1期135-148,共14页
Journal of China University of Geosciences(Social Sciences Edition)
基金
香港研究资助局项目"环境信息公开在中国:分析个人
组织
区域在供给和需求上的差异"(GRF 9042115/CityU 11405814)为本文的研究提供了资金支持
关键词
地方政府
制度分析
中央地方关系
国家社会关系
local government
institutional analysis
central-local relation
state-society relation
