摘要
本文运用新制度经济学中的公共选择理论,从分析各个行政层级利益冲突的视角来解释"强县扩权"改革中的"体制梗阻"成因,并通过模型厘清了作为驱动主体的省的利益动机及其与地级市的博弈关系。通过分析发现:在地方分权的背景下,省在财税目标和地方竞争的双重激励下具有"强县扩权"改革的利益动机,省与市之间的利益冲突是"体制梗阻"的症结;省在追求自身利益最大化的前提下,并无利益动机去进一步解决"强县扩权"过程中产生的体制矛盾,以及矫治后续改革中可能出现的问题;由于"强县扩权"改变了市的激励与约束机制,造成市对省实施改革的非合作博弈,并且改革的效果很大程度上内生于现实条件中结构化的市县格局。最后,本文就结论提出了相关政策建议。
We use the public choice theory in the new institutional economics to explain the cause of the institutional predicament in the ＂broadening the power for counties＂ reform from the perspective of the interest conflict among the administrative levels and establish the model to analyze the province＇s incentives and its game played with the prefecture-city. We get following conclusions. Under the decentralization, the province has the profit incentive to take the reform motivated by the fiscal target and the regional competition, and the main obstacle arises from the interest conflict between the province and the prefecture-level city. The province does not have the incentive to further overcome the obstacle and tackle the following problems on the basis of the maximization of its own interest. Because the reform changes the incentives and constraints of the prefecture-city,so it drives the city to play the non-cooperative game. We find that the gain of the reform largely depends on the structural pattern of the city and county in reality. Finally, we propose some policy advice based on conclusion.
作者
胡彬
胡晶
HU Bin HU Jing(Urban and Regional Science Institute of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai 200433, Chin)
出处
《中国工业经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第12期90-105,共16页
China Industrial Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金项目"经济结构调整与转变视角下的城市转型路径与机制研究"(批准号14BJL082)
关键词
强县扩权
体制困境
利益动机
行政层级
博弈
broaden the power for counties
institutional predicament
interest incentive
administrative levels
game
