摘要
针对由n个申请者和一个分配者组成的慈善基金分配问题,以社会效益最大化为目标,设计了当资金申请者具有同质性时的检查及分配机制.该机制在优势激励相容约束的基础上有效遏制了申请者说谎行为,结果表明:对每一个申请人而言,讲真话是一个纳什均衡,且在最优分配下,各申请者的分配总是依赖于每次报告中的最差类型申请人.通过对只有两个申请者的算例分析验证了该机制的可操作性,该研究为此类资金分配及检查问题提供了一定的参考.
This article studied the kind of charitable fund allocation problem which is consist of N applicants and an allocator, aiming at maximizing the social welfare and finally designed a corresponding allocation and inspection mechanism when the applicants are all identical. The mechanism stops the lying behavior of applicants effectively based on the dominant incentive compatible constraints. The results show that truth reporting is a Nash equilibrium for each applicant considering that the other applicants report truthfully. The allocation of each applicant relies on the worst type applicant in each report under the optimized allocation situation. Through an example analysis of two applicants, the manipulation of this new mechanism is identified. The research provides a reference for such kind of funding allocation and inspection problem.
出处
《系统工程理论与实践》
EI
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2016年第11期2898-2904,共7页
Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
基金
国家自然科学基金(71473213)
江苏省研究生科研创新项目(KYZZ_0284)
江苏省高校哲学社会科学重点项目(2014ZDIXM019)~~
关键词
机制设计
资金分配
人道物流
mechanism design
funding allocation
humanistic logistics
