摘要
关于财政分权与地方债务的关系,理论界主流观点是财政分权会引致地方政府支出规模的扩张;另有观点支持“利维坦假说”,认为财政分权可以限制地方政府支出规模的过度扩大。首先建立了财政分权与地方政府性债务关联的理论框架,继而从支出分权、收入分权和纵向财政不平衡三个角度分析其作用机制。并搜集1998-2013年中国26个地方政府的省级面板数据,先后采用OLS和固定效应以及SYS-GMM估计方法进行实证检验,尝试得出两者之间的长期关系。实证结果表明,提高收入分权,降低支出分权,缓解纵向财政不均衡,将有助于降低地方政府性债务水平。建议严格政府支出管理,加强中央事权和支出责任;同时适度放松收入管理,赋予地方政府有限的税收立法权。
There are two kinds of theoretical views about the relationship between fiscal de- centralization and local government debt. The mainstream view argues that fiscal decentralization will lead to the expansion of local government expenditure, and the other view supports the ＂Levi- athan hypothesis＂ ,which points out that fiscal decentralization can limit the excessive expansion of local government expenditure. Firstly, a theoretical framework on fiscal decentralization and local government debt is constructed, and the mechanism is analyzed from three angles including ex- penditure decentralization, revenue decentralization and vertical fiscal imbalance. ？ By using pro- vincial panel data of 26 local governments in China from 1998 to 2013, an empirical test is carried out by using the estimation methods of OLS, fixed effects, and SYS - GMM, aiming to find out the long - term relationship between the two variables. The results show that improving revenue decen- tralization, reducing expenditure decentralization and vertical fiscal imbalance will be helpful to lower the level of local government debt. The proposal is that management of local government ex- penditure should be stricter, central authority and expenditure responsibility should be further strengthened. Meanwhile, moderate revenue management should be carried out and limited tax legislative power should be given to local governments.
出处
《云南财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第5期17-30,共14页
Journal of Yunnan University of Finance and Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金项目"我国地方政府融资平台债务控制及其风险防范研究"(13BJY164)
山东省自然基金重点项目"山东省政府性债务控制及风险预警研究"(ZR2015GZ001)
关键词
地方政府债务水平
支出分权
收入分权
纵向财政不平衡
Local Government Debt
Expenditure Decentralization
Revenue Decentraliza-tion
Vertical Fiscal Imbalance
