摘要
我国政府间公共事务事权划分不仅参照效率原则,而且考虑政治风险因素。基于此逻辑,通过对环境治理事权细分并构建博弈模型,发现不同环境治理事权划分存在差异。具体到环评审批事权,其分权程度受地方科技水平的直接影响,本文采用省级面板数据对此进行实证检验,结果表明科技进步会促使中央下放环评审批事权,这也符合我国环评审批制度的改革历程。此外,中央政府不仅可以通过环境体制改革以降低政治风险,而且可以通过改变中央、地方和居民三者间环境偏好传导机制来改善环境治理效果。
Not only the principle of efficiency, but also the political risk factors should be taken into consideration whenit comes to the discussion of the governance division in public affairs in China. Based on this logic, we construct a game modelin this paper to analyze the mechanism of environmental governance power division. It’s found that there are differences betweendifferent environment governance division. To be specific, in terms of the EIA approval powers, the degree of decentralizationis directly influenced by the local science and technology level. Therefore, this paper uses provincial panel data to conductan empirical test, the results of which show that the progress of science and technology will promote the decentralization ofthe EIA approval power, which is also in line with the reform process of the EIA approval system in our country. In addition,we also find that the central government can not only reduce the political risk through environmental system reform, but alsocan adjust the environmental preference transmission mechanism of the central government, local governments and residents toimprove the environmental governance effect.
出处
《财经论丛》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第9期101-110,共10页
Collected Essays on Finance and Economics
关键词
环评审批
事权划分
科技进步
政治风险
效率原则
EIA approval
governance division
technical progress
political risk
efficiency principle
