摘要
本文以创业板公司为对象研究股权激励对高管离职的影响。结果发现,股票期权和限制性股票两种股权激励方式的作用存在区别;股票期权的实施导致公司高管更高的正常离职率,而限制性股票的实施则提高了高管非正常离职率。进一步区分高管职位类型后发现,限制性股票导致高管非正常原因离职的现象主要体现在高管担任除董事、监事和总经理外的其他高管组。本文研究结论有助于了解股权激励对创业板公司高管"扎堆"离职现象的影响,为公司未来制定股权激励计划,监管机构审批备案提供了实证支持。
Based on the data of GEM firms in China, this paper investigates whether stock incentive leads to management turnover. The result shows that stock incentive is positively related with management turnover. If the stock incentive is restricted stock, the probability of abnormal turnover of management will be higher. As the study goes further, we find that the positive relationship between restricted stock and abnormal turnover is evident when management is other manager except board director. Our results not only provide explanations to the managements＇ turnover, but also empirical result for company to design incentive plan and regulation.
出处
《证券市场导报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第8期22-32,共11页
Securities Market Herald
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71462011
71462012)
江西省社会科学研究"十二五"规划项目(13YJ52)的资助
