摘要
中国的＂撤县设区＂行政管理改革由于政策权力被上收同时弱化了发展经济的激励,因此能够足够外生地作为一项识别县域企业获得政府政策偏袒减少的外生冲击。基于这一自然实验,我们使用1999~2009年中国工业企业数据库中持续经营的企业平衡面板数据,检验了政策偏袒对企业出口的影响。研究结果表明：撤县设区改革之后,辖区内企业的出口绩效相对于其他企业显著变差。影响机制上,撤县设区改革导致县域政府财政支出重心转向非经济性事务,进而降低了辖区企业获得的财政补贴、税收优惠等政策收益,最终恶化了企业的出口绩效。文章的政策含义在于：政府支持对于提高中国产品海外竞争力及扩大市场份额存在积极作用,而政策设计如何兼顾公平、营造平等政策环境同样值得关注。中国撤县设区改革一定程度上发挥了打破市场行政分割和政策保护壁垒、促进了统一性公平政策形成的作用。
Within the framework of Chinese decentralization style, the local governments have been given a strong motivation for policy competition in the key tax sources and GDP. And the exogenous administrative restructuring, which is known as ＂Annexation of suburban counties by cities＂ Reform, can be used to identify the variation of governmental favoritism, because it decreased the policies for supporting the firms. Applying panels of firms data from the Chinese Industrial Enterprises Database for the period 1999 to 2009 with the natural experiment, this paper outlines the extent to which local governments favoritism influenced firms＇ export performance. We find that： compared to other firms located in the control group, the export performance become worse after the governmental favoritism is reduced. The causal mechanism is firms suffer from a worse - off export performance for the reduced governmental favoritism as a result of getting the worse polices, such as less subsidies and more taxation.
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第7期33-47,共15页
Journal of Financial Research
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目(项目批准号:71503187
71503270)
教育部人文社科青年基金项目(项目批准号:14YJC790015)
武汉大学人文社会科学青年学者学术发展计划
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金的资助
关键词
政府支持
出口
撤县设区
倍差法
Governmental Favoritism, Export Performance, Annexation of Suburban Counties by Cities,Difference - in - Difference Method
