摘要
基于契约经济学的模型分析结果显示,在信贷担保市场上,具有风险厌恶倾向的银行不仅会选择低风险的担保人作为交易对手,而且还必须将担保人在借款人违约时履行代偿义务的概率大于0.5作为发放担保贷款的充要条件。这既与调研发现一致,又能进一步为基于实地调查数据的分位数回归所证实,即银行偏爱团场担保甚于上市公司对外担保,因为担保制度设计的激励约束机制差异使得前者的违约风险低于后者,而且事实上前者在实践中的确没有发生违约事件,后者却屡屡违约。因此,银行在决定发放担保贷款时,理应重点评估担保人履行代偿义务的概率。
The model analysis based upon contractual economics suggests that the bank with risk aver- sion tendency would not only choose a bondsman of low risk to be counterparty, but also regard it as a necessary and sufficient condition that the probability of bondsman＇s performing compensatory obligations is more than 0.5 in case of borrower＇s default. This hypothesis is in line with investigating findings, which could be rectified by the data collected in the investigation. That is, the bank prefers regiment collateral to listed company＇s collateral because the difference of incentive and restraint mechanism in the collateral in- stitutional design makes the former＇s default rate lower the latter＇s and the fact is that the former never commits default and the latter always does it. So the bank should earnestly assess the probability of bondsman＇s performing compensatory obligation when it makes a decision of supplying a guaranteed loan.
出处
《石家庄学院学报》
2016年第4期5-20,共16页
Journal of Shijiazhuang University
基金
天津市社科规划项目"缓解中小企业融资难的信贷担保制度创新研究"(TJYY13-019)
天津工业大学2015年高等教育教学改革研究项目"金融市场数据挖掘人才培养方案研究"(TJPUEUJJ2015-06)
关键词
信贷担保
制度设计
信息不对称
代偿义务
分位数回归
credit collateral
institutional design
information asymmetry
compensatory obligation
quantile regression
