摘要
清末预备立宪财政危机深重,曾有经资政院"疏通舆论"增税之议,但资政院、咨议局只是微妙的民意(准代议)机构,议员请求"赋权于院"、"许民监察",屡为清廷所拒。由于缺乏监督政府说服民众之权能,资政院、咨议局终难协调政府增税。反过来立宪派也以税收作筹码,提请朝廷速开国会。但由于目标意识不确,上下缺乏真诚互动,英法美革命中税收与代议制博弈的一幕在清末没有出现,税收推动型代议制最终未能确立。
In the end of Qing Dynasty,as preparation for Constitutionalism was grieved by financial crisis,discussions on mediating public opinion and increasing taxes through the Advisory Council surfaced. However,the Advisory Council and the Consultative Bureau were only quasi- representative institutions,where representation for public opinion was subtle. Requests of empowering the Advisory Council and allowing public supervision from the members of council were repeatedly rejected by Qing government. Due to the lack to authority to supervise government and thus to convince the public,the Advisory Council and the Consultative Bureau failed to facilitate tax hike. In contrast,holding tax hike as a bargaining chip,the constitutionalists urged the government to establish Parliament. However,impeded by the insistent aims and insincere internal interaction,the no- taxation- without- representation confrontation common seen in British,American,and French revolutions did not occur in the end of Qing Dynasty,and the representation by taxation was not founded.
出处
《哈尔滨工业大学学报（社会科学版）》
2016年第3期22-30,2,共9页
Journal of Harbin Institute of Technology(Social Sciences Edition)
关键词
清朝末年
预备立宪
财政税收
资政院
咨议局
财政社会学
end of Qing Dynasty
preparation for constitutionalism
tax revenue
Advisory Council
Consultative Bureau
financial sociology
