摘要
基于演化博弈理论与方法,建立了煤炭绿色开采监管博弈模型,运用动态分析方法解析了政府监管部门与煤炭企业之间策略互动及其动态调整过程,并验证了参数变化对博弈结果的影响,研究结果表明:强化政府机构监管能力、加大对煤炭企业违规的处罚力度、提高政府机构监管意愿、降低政府监管成本、强化对政府机构失职的问责力度,可以使博弈结果走向良好的收敛状态。根据分析结果,提出了若干优化中国煤炭资源绿色开采监管的政策建议。
An evolutionary game model of supervision on the coal green exploitation that evolved the government agencies and coal enterprises were established firstly,then dynamic analysis method were used to analyze the strategic interaction and its dynamic adjustment between government supervisors agencies and coal enterprises,and the influence of parameters change that delegate different supervision policy,was analyzed by numerical simulation method. The results show that reducing the government supervisory costs,increasing government supervisory willingness,strengthening government supervisory capacity,strengthening the accountability of government agencies,and increasing the penalties for coal enterprises wrongdoing,can make the game converge to good results,among them,strengthening government supervisory capacity and increasing the penalties for coal enterprises wrongdoing have better effect than other measures. Finally,some political proposals were put forward to optimize China ＇s supervision of coal green exploitation system.
出处
《西安科技大学学报》
CAS
北大核心
2016年第3期349-355,共7页
Journal of Xi’an University of Science and Technology
基金
国家软科学研究计划项目(2013GXS4D151)
陕西省软科学研究计划重点项目(2012KR2-01)
陕西省软科学研究计划项目(2014KRM86)
关键词
煤炭
绿色开采
演化博弈
监管
coal
green exploitation
evolutionary game
supervision
