摘要
为向技术创新企业提供有效的融资策略,借助演化博弈工具,构建了技术创新企业在融资过程中与风险投资之间的博弈模型,对双方的策略选择进行了动态稳定性分析,通过对模型参数的优化调整,提出良性的演化状态,并使用数值仿真分析,验证研究结果。研究表明,技术创新企业自身的创新能力是融资的关键,风险投资的资金投入是企业创新的动力,而技术创新收益的合理分配则是企业从风险投资那里获得融资的保障。最后根据研究结果,基于演化博弈模型提出相应建议。
To provide effective financing strategies for technical innovation enterprises, this paper used the tool of evolutionary game, built a game model between technological innovation enterprises and the venture capital in the financing process of enterprises and conducted dynamic stability analysis to give strategy choices of both. The paper proposed evolution benign state through the optimal adjustment of model parameters, then verify the results of the research by simulation. Research shows that technological innovation enterprises＇ own ability to innovate is the key to financing, capital funding of venture investment is the driving force of innovation, and the reasonable distribution of income is guarantees for technical innovation enterprises to get finance from venture investment. Finally, this paper puts forward corresponding suggestions based on the results of the research.
出处
《中国科技资源导刊》
2016年第1期80-87,共8页
China Science & Technology Resources Review
关键词
技术创新
融资
演化博弈
风险投资
数值分析
technical innovation, financing, evolutionary game, venture capital, simulation
