摘要
The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the differential game with a coalition structure is proposed. A few assumptions about the deviation instant for a coalition are made concerning the behavior of a group of many individuals in certain dynamic environments.From these, the time-consistent cooperative agreement can be strategically supported by ε-Nash or strong ε-Nash equilibria. While in games in the extensive form with perfect information, it is somewhat surprising that without the assumptions of deviation instant for a coalition, Nash or strong Nash equilibria can be constructed.
The problem of strategic stability of long-range cooperative agreements in dynamic games with coalition structures is investigated. Based on imputation distribution procedures, a general theoretical framework of the differential game with a coalition structure is proposed. A few assumptions about the deviation instant for a coalition are made concerning the behavior of a group of many individuals in certain dynamic environments.From these, the time-consistent cooperative agreement can be strategically supported by ε-Nash or strong ε-Nash equilibria. While in games in the extensive form with perfect information, it is somewhat surprising that without the assumptions of deviation instant for a coalition, Nash or strong Nash equilibria can be constructed.
基金
supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant Nos.71171120
71373262 and 71571108)
Projects of International(Regional)Cooperation and Exchanges of National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.71411130215)
Specialized Research Fund for the Doctoral Program of Higher Education of China(Grant No.20133706110002)
Natural Science Foundation of Shandong Province of China(Grant No.ZR2015GZ007)
Saint Petersburg State University(Grant No.9.38.245.2014)
