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经理市场、外部董事与企业资本投资——基于民营上市公司的研究 被引量:1

Manager Market,Outside Directors and Corporate Capital Investment——Evidence from the Private Listed Companies
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摘要 文章以2007-2013年中国民营上市公司为样本,考察外部董事对企业资本配置效率的影响。研究发现:随着外部董事比例的提高,企业投资反应系数越大,资本配置效率越高;外部董事提升企业资本配置效率的作用源于外部董事可拓展企业投资机会并扩大投资规模。进一步研究发现:发育较好的经理市场中,企业投资机会与投资规模显著增加;发育欠佳的经理市场中,外部董事拓展企业投资机会与投资规模、提升资本配置效率的作用更佳。这些结果表明,外部董事能改善公司投资效率,经理市场发育可降低企业对外部管理才能的依赖程度。 Taking the private listed companies in China from 2007 to 2013 as the samples, this paper investigates the impact of outside directors on corporate capital allocation efficiency. The study shows that: With the increase of the proportion of outside directors, the greater the corporate investment response coefficient, the higher the capital allocation efficiency ; The role of outside directors to improve corporate capital allocation efficiency is because outside directors can develop corporate investment opportunities and expand investment scale. A further study finds that corporate investment opportunities and investment scale increase significantly in better developed manager market, whereas the role played by outside directors in developing corporate investment opportunities and investment scale as well as improving corporate capital allocation efficiency is better in less developed manager market. These results indicate that outside directors can improve corporate investment efficiency,and the development of manager market can reduce corporate dependence on outside management ability.
出处 《华东经济管理》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第3期42-49,共8页 East China Economic Management
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(71262025) 国家社会科学基金项目(12BJY015)
关键词 投资机会 资本配置效率 外部董事 经理市场 investment opportunity capital allocation efficiency outside director manager market
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参考文献32

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