摘要
文章以2004-2013年国有上市公司为样本,研究政府干预和政策引导下的公司治理因素对国有企业投资行为的影响。结果表明,政府干预能够缓解因融资约束而产生的投资不足,而对因代理问题产生的过度投资情况没有显著影响。此外,随着国有企业"现代企业制度"的建立,国有资本运营管理公司持股和建立独立董事制度不仅会对国企的投资行为产生影响,还将为政府对国企投资行为的干预作用提供便利或增加阻碍,加强或减弱政府干预的作用。高管持股比例、高管薪酬等其他治理因素对国企投资行为也有不同程度的影响。
Taking the listed state-owned companies in China from 2004 to 2013 as the samples, this paper analyzes the impacts of government intervention and corporate governance factors advocated by policies on the investment behavior of state-owned enterprises （SOEs）. The results show that government intervention will alleviate the under-investment of SOEs caused by financing constraints, but no significant impact on the over-investment situation of SOEs which is caused by the agency problem. In addition, along with the establishment of ＂modern enterprise system＂ of SOEs, the stock ownership of state-owned capital operation and management company and the establishment of an independent director system will not only affect the investment behavior of SOEs, but also provide convenience or increase the obstacles to the role of goernment intervention in the investment behavior of SOEs, to strengthen or weaken the role of government intervention. Executive shareholding ratio, executive pay and other governance factors have different levels of impacts on the investment behavior of SOEs.
出处
《华东经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第3期34-41,共8页
East China Economic Management
关键词
政府干预
公司治理
投资行为
国有企业
资本配置效率
government intervention
corporate governance
investment behavior
state- owned enterprises
capitalallocation efficiency
