摘要
作为现金拍卖的替代方式,发明人可以通过股份支付来实现技术拍卖.企业以股份竞标,当技术产业化后,发明人根据股份分享利润.基于对称独立私有价值模型,分析了股份拍卖的最优机制,获胜企业和发明人的股份分配和保留价格.与现金拍卖相比较,股份拍卖期望收益与成交率都更高.采用一价或二价标准股份拍卖时,发明人的期望收益是相同的,收益等价原理仍然成立.一价,二价股份拍卖都是最优拍卖机制.
An inventor can implement technology auction in terms of a stock auction,which is a alternative of cash auction.Firms bid with stocks,through which the inventor shares in profits when the technology is industrialized.Based on a symmetric independent private value model,the optimal mechanism of the stock auction,stocks allocation between the winner and the inventor,and the reservation price are analyzed.Compared with the cash auction,the stock auction leads to increased expected revenue and a higher turnover rate.The first price and the second price standard stock auction yield the same expected revenue to the inventor,so the revenue equivalence principle still holds.The first price and the second price stock auction are all optimal auction mechanisms.
出处
《系统工程理论与实践》
EI
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2016年第2期326-334,共9页
Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
基金
国家自然科学基金(71162024)
中国博士后基金(2013M531181)
上海市博士后基金(13R21414800)
江西省教育厅科技基金(GJJ11504)~~
关键词
技术拍卖
股份拍卖
最优机制
收益等价
technology auction
stock auction
optimal mechanism
revenue equivalence
