摘要
经典拍卖理论无法理解网络拍卖中的一口价拍卖,已有文献从风险态度和交易成本的角度给出了解释,但却难以解释"一口价"设定比例的横截面差异。利用网站大样本数据,本文对已有理论进行了检验,证实了风险态度和交易成本的作用。然而控制这些因素之后,卖家信用水平仍然对一口价的设定和执行具有显著的影响,一口价对于买家估价和出价的参考作用同样显著,而且效果与卖家的信用水平正相关,从而验证了一口价的信息与信誉机制。
There is a special type of auction named Buy-price Auction in online market that is beyond the understanding of the classical auction theories.Economists tried to explain the phe- nomenon with risk aversion and transaction cost.They succeeded in some extent,except for the cross sectional variation of adoption rate of buy price.Using a large sample of online transactions, this paper tests previous theories,which indicate that risk aversion and transaction cost really matter in this case.But after they are controlled,seller's reputation has a significant effect on the decision of a seller whether to set a buy price in his online auction and that of a buyer facing a buy-price auction whether to execute the buy price.Buy price also has a significant direction effect to the buyer's valuation of the article,the scale of which positively correlates with the seller's rep- utation.Then we get the evidence to understand buy price as an information and reputation mecha- nism in a buy-price auctions.
出处
《产业经济评论（山东）》
CSSCI
2008年第2期46-67,共22页
Review of Industrial Economics
关键词
网络拍卖
混合拍卖
一口价
信息
信誉
Online Auction
Buy-price Auction
Buy Price
Information
Reputation
