摘要
利用不完全信息静态博弈原理,构建了政府、科技型中小企业与民间资本投资主体的三方混合战略博弈模型,计算了博弈各方实现最大化效用时的均衡状态解,并进一步分析了在各方博弈过程中相关因素对均衡状态的影响,发现对违反法规的处罚力度、政府的监督成本及监管有效度、政府的资金支持程度等因素都会对博弈的均衡概率产生一定的影响。在此基础上,利用调查数据,对模型推导结果进行了实证检验,支持了相关结论具有可靠性。
Depending on the theory of the static game of incomplete information, this paper constructs a tripartite mixed strategy game model among government, technology-based SMEs and invertors of private capital. The equilibrium state of the maximization of utility of the parties is calculated, the influence of the relevant factors on equilibrium state in process of the game is further analyzed. It is found that the punishment for illegal activities, cost and effectiveness of government supervision, financial support from government and other related factors will affect the probability of equilibrium state. Based on those steps and survey data, this paper demonstrates the model deduction results to support the reliability of those conclusions.
出处
《价值工程》
2016年第6期53-56,共4页
Value Engineering
基金
2015年浙江省大学生科技创新活动计划暨新苗人才计划项目"民间资本投资科技型中小企业的协同机理与实证研究"(项目编号:2015R417023)
2014嘉兴学院"大学生创新能力个性化培养"项目(项目编号:20141012)
浙江省科技厅软科学项目"浙江省民间资本与高新技术创业投资对接的风险分担机制研究"(编号:2014C35044)资助
关键词
民间资本投资主体
科技型中小企业
政府
博弈
实证研究
investors of private capital
technology-based SMEs
government
game
empirical analysis
