摘要
引入来源于中央委员会的地区政治权力指标,考察了中央政府对地方政府预算外资金的控制效果。一方面,样本省份的政治权力越高,预算外资金的比重越低;另一方面,政治权力对行政政府和行政官僚发挥正向调节作用,即样本省份的政治权力越高,一定的行政政府和行政官僚能够带来更高的预算外资金比例。政治权力的复杂证据表明,控制、优化预算外性质的资金,除了需要财务层次上的管理改进,还需要深入到政治、行政层次上的制度改革。
This article examines the effects of central government control on local government extra-budgetary funds, via the introduction of provincial political power indicator stemming from the Central Committee. On the one hand, the higher the political power of the sample province in the Central Committee, the lower the proportion of extra-budgetary funds. On the other hand, provincial political power makes positive moderating effect on administrative government as well as administrative bureaucrats, i.e., certain administrative government as well as bureaucrats with more political power lead to much more extra-budgetary funds. The complex evidence of political power suggests that the control and optimization of extra-budgetary funds not only need the enhancement at fiscal management level, but also need the institutional reform at political and executive level.
出处
《山西财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第2期1-13,共13页
Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics
基金
国家社科基金重点项目(15AZZ011)
教育部规划基金项目(13YJA630009)
关键词
预算外资金
政治权力
中央委员
中央政府
地方政府
extra-budgetary funds
political power
Central Committee member
central government
local government
