摘要
本文以《关于实施上市公司股息红利差别化个人所得税政策有关问题的通知》的颁布为"自然实验",研究资本市场对股利税调整的反应以及股利税调整对公司治理问题的影响。研究发现,政策颁布期间资本市场有显著为正的市场反应;相对而言,现金分红水平预期提升较大的公司市场反应显著较好;高管持股比例越高,公司累计超额收益率越高;第一大股东持股比例越高,公司累计超额收益率越低。这些结果表明,《通知》将提高现金分红的预期水平,从而缓解高管与股东间的委托代理问题,但却加剧了大股东与中小股东间的代理问题。本文的研究不仅丰富了分红与代理问题的文献,也为中国股利税改革提供了借鉴。
China changed its tax treatment of stockholders in 2012, from a system in which every stockholder paid taxes on the same tax rate to a system in which long-term stockholders are taxed on lower tax rates, according to the 85th Fiscal Taxation Document. The switch from average taxation to differentiated taxation changed incentives for stock holding and dividends distribution. This paper investigates the effects of the conversion to differentiated taxation, taking advantage of a natural experiment created by the release of new policy. Our study shows that during the releasel the stock market boomed up in general, revealing positive response to the new policy. In further study, we show five more findings. Firstly, the market response to firms with lower cash payouts in the past three years becomes worse. Secondly, the cumulative abnormal return rate is higher in the companies with higher senior executives＇ ownership proportion. Thirdly, the cumulative abnormal return rate of those companies with lower cash payouts in the past three years and higher senior executives＇ ownership proportion is higher. Fourth- ly, cumulative abnormal return rate decreases when shares held by largest shareholder increase. Finally, the cumulative abnormal return rate is lower in firms with higher largest shareholder own- ership proportion and lower cash payouts in the past three years. These results suggesting that the new policy can reduce the tax rate on dividends and improve firms＇ cash payouts. What＇s more, these results also suggesting that this policy can alleviate the prin- cipal-agent problems between executives and shareholders （Type I agency problems）, but may encourage the largest shareholder to expropriate the benefits of small or medium investors in the firm, reflecting conflict of interests between insiders and outsiders in the principle-agent relationship of listed companies （Type II agency problems）. This paper not only enriches the principle-agent literature, but also provides practical policy suggestions f
出处
《南开管理评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第1期142-154,共13页
Nankai Business Review
基金
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(JBK1407037)资助
关键词
股利税差别化
市场反应
预期分红
高管及大股东持股
代理问题
Differentiated Dividend Taxation
Market Reaction
Expected Dividends
Executive and Largest Shareholder Shareholding Rate
Principal-agent Problem
