摘要
本文从最优契约理论、管理层权力理论和心理所有权理论等视角对高管显性激励安排与代理成本关系的研究成果进行了述评,发现该领域研究正在逐步由关注单一激励安排的局部均衡分析阶段,向更加注重协同效应的一般均衡分析阶段过渡。针对现有研究存在的不足,本文提出了未来研究的展望,包括正确区分股权和期权激励对代理成本的不同影响、系统考虑显性激励与隐性激励的协同效应、深化心理因素对高管激励安排的治理效果等。
This paper makes comments on the research achievements of the relationship between dominant executive incentives and agency costs from the perspectives of optimal contract theory, managerial power theory and psychological ownership theory. Then it argues that the research is developing gradually from the phase of partial equilibrium analysis of sin gle incentive arrangement to the phase of general equilibrium analysis which pays more at- tention to the synergistic effects. Based on the deficiencies of existing research, this paper puts forward future directions in this field, including exact distinction of different effects of equity and option incentives on agency costs, systematic consideration of the synergistic effects of dominant and implicit incentives, and deepening the governance effects of psycho- logical factors on executive incentive arrangement.
出处
《外国经济与管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第1期101-112,共12页
Foreign Economics & Management
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(71272120)
国家自然科学基金青年项目(71302089)
关键词
高管显性激励
代理成本
薪酬激励
股权激励
期权激励
dominant executive incentive
agency cost
compensation incentive
equity in-centive
option incentive
