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政绩诉求、政府干预与地区环境污染——基于中国城市数据的实证分析 被引量:30

Political Achievement Demands of Local Officials,Government Intervention and Regional Environmental Pollution: Empirical Analysis Based on Chinese City-level Data
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摘要 本文利用2004-2010年中国城市层面数据,从官员激励的视角实证考察了官员政绩诉求对地区环境污染水平的影响。研究发现,官员政绩诉求对环境污染水平具有显著的正向影响,且这一结论在区分不同区域和不同时间段的分样本回归中依然成立。在政府对资源配置干预越多的地区,政绩诉求对环境污染水平的正向影响越明显。上述发现在经过一系列稳健性检验后仍然成立。本研究不仅提供了市级官员激励影响地区环境保护的经验证据,也为现阶段的环境污染治理提供了有益的政策借鉴。 Using the city- level data in China from 2004 to 2010,this paper tests the impact of officials' promotion pressure on environmental pollution. The results indicate a significant positive effect of officials' promotion incentives on environmental pollution,which still stands after considering the variant of region and timing. The positive effect of officials' promotion incentives on environmental pollution is even stronger in areas where government has more intervention in resources allocation.These findings are robust through several robustness checks. This paper is helpful in understanding the effect of municipal officials' incentive on environmental protection,and also provides useful policy implications for environmental pollution control.
出处 《中国经济问题》 CSSCI 北大核心 2015年第5期35-45,共11页 China Economic Studies
基金 中国博士后科学基金第57批面上项目(2015M572436)二等资助
关键词 政绩诉求 官员环保激励 政府干预 地区环境污染 political achievement demands of local officials officials' incentive on environmental protection government intervention environmental pollution
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参考文献31

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