摘要
利用2013年沪深A股上市1118家制造企业数据为样本,研究高管内部薪酬差距对投资行为和企业绩效的影响。结果发现:拉大高管内部薪酬差距能够一定程度上促进企业采取积极的投资行为,提高企业投资水平,提升企业绩效,但拉大高管内部薪酬差距不会提高企业投资效率,即企业投资规模的扩大并不意味着投资效率的提高;在不同所有制样本中,拉大高管内部薪酬差距对非国有企业投资水平影响显著,但对国有企业没有影响。研究结果深化了高管内部薪酬差距对企业绩效内在影响的机理分析,为我国上市制造企业高管薪酬的制度设计带来启示。
Using the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share 1118 listed manufacturing enterprises of 2013 this paper study the influence of Internal pay gap of executives on investment and company performance. The findings discloses that, to some extent, widening compensation gap a- mong executives promotes enterpnse for more positive investment, higher business investment level, and performance, however, it has little possibility to improve investment efficiency, which means the expansion of business investment will not drive investment efficiency. In the samples of different ownership, widening the pay gap is significant to investment of Non-state-owned enterprises, while it is of little importance to state-owned enterprises. The research results makes an elaborate analysis of the inherent effect of internal pay gap to enterprise performance, bringing en- lightenment on the design of compensation of executives from Chinese listed manufacturing com- panies.
出处
《科学决策》
CSSCI
2015年第10期66-81,共16页
Scientific Decision Making
基金
甘肃省教育厅课题(项目编号:1001-25)
关键词
高管内部薪酬差距
投资水平
投资效率
企业绩效
internal pay gap of executives
investment levels
investment efficiency
enterprise performance
