摘要
本文使用2007-2013年上市公司非均衡面板数据,基于CEO权力视角研究股权激励对企业风险承担水平的影响。研究发现,对CEO进行股权激励可以提升企业风险承担水平;CEO权力会负向调节股权激励与风险承担之间的正向关系;进一步研究外部行业竞争治理作用时发现,行业竞争可以抑制CEO权力对股权激励效果的负面影响。
Using the unbalanced panel data of listed companies from 2007 to 2013, based on the perspective of CEO power , this paper empirically examines the equity incentive effects on corporate risk-taking. The result shows that the CEO equity incentives can improve risk bearing level of the enterprise; but CEO power will negatively adjust the relationship between equity incentive and corporate risk-taking; Further this paper explores the role of external governance, finding that the level of competition of the industry can inhibit the negative effect of CEO power on the effect of the equity incentives.
出处
《上海管理科学》
2015年第5期60-65,共6页
Shanghai Management Science
关键词
CEO权力
股权激励
风险承担
行业竞争
CEO power
Equity incentive
Risk-taking
Competition of the industry
